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Identity Crisis:
A Vision for the Right of Publicity
in the Year 2020
A SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY
VOLUNTEER LAWYERS FOR THE ARTS*
DAN MAYER': The purpose of tonight's program is to explore the
future of art and entertainment law.2 New technologies and their
explosion of growth in the entertainment and art industry has put
increased pressure on established legal definitions and traditional
relationships between artists, producers, and presenters. This program
will examine the right of publicity, or the right of an individual to control
the commercial exploitation of his or her identity in our new multi-media
society.
Tonight's program has been long in the making and there are several
persons who must be thanked. First, I would like to thank the Joe &
Emily Lowe Foundation and the Reed Foundation for their generous
support in underwriting this program. I would also like to thank Davis
Polk & Wardwell for the use of its conference and reception facilities. A
special thanks to VLA's Chairman Scott Wise for his assistance and
guidance in making sure that this program was a success.
As most of you know, this program is the second half of a pair of
programs on the right of publicity. Several weeks ago, Thomas McCarthy
delivered the eighth Horace H. Manges lecture entitled The Human
Persona as Commercial Property - The Right of Publicity at Columbia
University School of Law.' VLA thanks the Dean of the Faculty of Law
and the Center for Law and the Arts at Columbia for their cooperation
in jointly sponsoring these programs. In particular, I would like to thank
Adria Kaplan who has been a true partner in planning these programs.
I would like to thank the VIA staff who have been working on this
program for over a year. Special thanks to Nancy Adelson, who created
tonight's hypothetical question and selected our panel of distinguished
experts. I appreciate Nancy's efforts and the countless hours that she has
spent over the last few months preparing for this event. Also, thanks to
Esther McGowan for her assistance in the preparations for tonight.
* [Eds. note: All footnotes that have an asterisk following the footnote number were
added by the editors to help readers locate secondary sources. Footnotes without asterisks
were added by the speakers.]
Copyright © 1995 by Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts ("VLA")
1.* Executive Director, Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts.
2.* March 29, 1995.
3.* For Professor McCarthy's lecture, see The Human Persona as Commercial
Property - The Right of Publicity, 19 COLUM. - VLA J.L. & ARTS 129 (1995).
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I have spoken to a few colleagues who have questioned the meaning
of the title of tonight's program. This title has two meanings; first,
Identity Crisis: A Vision for the Right of Publicity in the Year 2020 refers
to 20/20 or perfect vision, and we all hope that all of us have perfect
insight in the directions the law will take in the future. Second, the title
of tonight's program also refers to the year 2020, which will mark the
50th Anniversary of Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts. I'm confident that
there will be an even greater need for the services of VLA in the years
to come, and that the art and legal communities will continue to support
this organization into the next century.
Now, Nancy Adelson will introduce tonight's panelists who will begin
the program. Thank you. [Applause]
NANCY ADELSON:' Can everyone hear me? I'm delighted to
introduce our panelists. Before I do, I want to call your attention to a
sheet that you will see in the packet of materials that we've handed out
to you. It contains more extensive biographical information about our
panelists. My goal is to just whet your appetites; you can fill in the
blanks with the biographical sheet.'
I'd like to introduce the speakers in alphabetical order. First, Kenneth
B. Anderson is a partner at the firm of Loeb and Loeb, where he
represents top recording artists, composers, record companies and
publishers. He was also involved in some of the leading digital sampling
cases during the 1980's.6 Laura R. Handman is a partner at the firm of
Lankenau, Kovner, and Kurtz, where she represents a wide variety of
media and publishing clients in the areas of libel, privacy, copyright, and
related matters. She has also served as a member of the Board of
Directors of Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts.7
4.* Nancy Adelson was, until recently, staff attorney for Volunteer Lawyers for the
Arts.
5.* The information from the biographical sheet has been inserted following the
introduction of each speaker.
6. Kenneth B. Anderson, Esq.: Mr. Anderson is a partner in the New York office of the
law fi-m of Loeb & Loeb, where he specializes in the representation of companies and
individuals engaged in the music industry. He represents top recording artists, composers,
record companies and publishers in the negotiation of significant transactions. Mr.
Anderson also specializes in intellectual property litigation involving new technology and
music, including many of the leading cases arising from digital sampling. Mr. Anderson
is a graduate of Rutgers University School of Law.
7. Laura R. Handman, Esq.: As a partner in the law firm of Lankenau, Kovner & Kurtz,
Ms. Handman represents national magazines, news weeklies, book publishers and
broadcasters in the areas of libel, privacy, obscenity, copyright, trademark, unfair
competition, advertising and publishing law. She was lead counsel in several important
New York right of publicity cases, including Hampton v. Guare, in which she successfully
defended playwright John Guare against a claim by David Hampton that his "persona" was
wrongfully appropriated for the character "Paul" in the award winning play Six Degrees of
Separation. Ms. Handman served on the Board of Directors of Volunteer Lawyers for the
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Next, Rick Kurnit is a partner at Frankfurt, Garbus, Klein & Selz. His
clients include advertising agencies, P.R. firms and publishing compa-
nies. He also teaches advertising law and has represented defendants in
many of the well-known look-alike cases which we'll be discussing
tonight.8 Professor Willajeanne McLean is behind me. She's an Associate
Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law.
Professor McLean concentrates in trademark and copyright law and has
written and spoken extensively in these areas.9
Next, Jonathan P. Reichman is a partner at the firm of Kenyon &
Kenyon where, among other aspects of his practice, he licenses and
enforces the rights vested in fictional and animated characters. He also
chairs the New York State Bar Association's Committee on the Rights of
Privacy and Publicity.' Stan Winsten, who I know I'm blocking,
deserves a special round of applause for his heroic efforts in the face of
a VCR monitor which literally committed suicide right before our eyes
before the program began. He heads The Winsten Company, a multime-
dia and music industry consulting firm, and also serves as the Chief
Operating Officer of R/GA Interactive, a multimedia company that he
Arts from 1987-1993, and is a member of the Media Law Committee of the New York State
Bar Association. She received her J.D. from Boston University School of Law.
8. Richard A. Kurnit, Esq.: Mr. Kurnit is a partner in the law firm of Frankfurt,
Garbus, Klein & Selz, where he represents numerous advertising agencies, public relations,
promotion and publishing companies. He teaches advertising law and lectures regularly
for the American Association of Advertising Agencies, the Promotion Marketing Association
of America and other industry groups, and is on the faculty of the American Law Institute
American Bar Association's course on marketing and distribution of products. He is also
a trial lawyer and handles cases involving comparative advertising, libel, copyright,
trademark, and rights of privacy and publicity. He represented defendants in the "Vanna
White," "Woody Allen" and "Jackie Onassis" look-alike cases. Mr. Kurnit is a graduate of
Harvard Law School.
9. Professor Willajeanne F. McLean: Professor McLean is an Associate Professor of Law
at the University of Connecticut School of Law, where she concentrates in trademark and
copyright law. She has authored a variety of articles on these and related topics, including
"All's Not Fair in Art and War: A Look at the Fair Use Defense after Rogers v. Koons,"
published in 1993 in the Brooklyn Law Review, and lectures frequently on these issues.
Prior to embarking on her academic career, Professor McLean was associated with the New
York firm of Darby & Darby, P.C. Professor McLean received her J.D. from Fordham
University School of Law and an L.L.M. in European Community Law at the Free
University of Brussels.
10. Jonathan D. Reichman, Esq.: Mr. Reichman is a partner in the law firm of
Kenyon & Kenyon, where he specializes in litigation, licensing and counseling matters in
the fields of copyright, trademark, unfair competition and right of publicity law. A major
aspect of Mr. Reichman's practice involves the protection, defense, enforcement, licensing
and exploitation of rights vested in fictional and animated characters, including Spiderman,
Babar the Elephant, and Abbot & Costello. Mr. Reichman successfully represented the
Joseph Campbell Foundation in a right of publicity suit over the unauthorized use of the
late scholar's name in connection with a mythology book. He has written on copyright,
trademark and publicity law and lectures extensively on these topics. He is a graduate of
Stanford Law School.
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spearheaded the formation of in 1993." Next, Diane Leenheer Zimmer-
man is a Professor of Law at New York University School of Law and, in
fact, she taught me everything I know about real property law. Her other
areas of expertise include copyright law and technology and constitution-
al law, with a particular focus in the areas of First Amendment and
right of privacy. 2 And last, but by no means least, directly in front of
me is our moderator, Professor Beryl R. Jones. She is a Professor of Law
at the Brooklyn Law School, where she concentrates in property,
copyright and international intellectual property law. Professor Jones is
also a member of the Board of Directors of Volunteer Lawyers for the
Arts, and she graciously agreed to serve as moderator when a conflict
developed for our initial moderator. We're delighted to have her and I'm
pleased to turn the floor over to Beryl. 3 [Applause]
PROFESSOR BERYL JONES: This evening's panel will discuss the
legal issues raised by a hypothetical involving a docudrama and the use
of a celebrity's images or private person's images in that docudrama.
Before we start, I thought it might be helpful to give a very brief outline
on the right of publicity for those in the audience who are not familiar
11. Stan Winsten, Esq.: Mr. Winsten has over fourteen years of experience as a
business executive in both the music and interactive multimedia industries. Mr. Winsten
heads The Winsten Company, a multimedia and music industry consulting firm, which
provides advice and counsel with respect to business development and the acquisition of
investment capital and related business plans for its clients, as well as business affairs
services in structuring and negotiating agreements related to the interactive multimedia
and music industries. In 1993, Mr. Winsten spearheaded the formation of R/GA Interactive
and is currently the acting Chief Operating Officer of this multimedia company. Mr.
Winsten, who is also an attorney, graduated from South Western University Law School
and began his career as an entertainment lawyer.
12. Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman: Professor Zimmerman is a Professor of
Law at New York University School of Law. She teaches real property, torts and
constitutional law (particularly in the areas of first amendment and right of privacy),
copyright, and law and technology, among other subjects. In 1994 she was Distinguished
Visiting Professor at the Marshall-Whythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
Among her numerous professional activities, Professor Zimmerman recently served as Chair
of the First Amendment Rights Committee, Section of Individual Rights and Responsibili-
ties, American Bar Association. She is a member of the Committee on Communications and
Media Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York. She lectures and publishes
extensively on first amendment and related issues. Professor Zimmerman received her J.D.
from Columbia University School of Law.
13. Professor Beryl R. Jones, Moderator: Professor Jones is a Professor of Law at
Brooklyn Law School, where she concentrates in copyright, property and international
intellectual property law. Among her many professional activities, Professor Jones serves
on the Board of Directors of Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, is a Trustee of the Copyright
Society of the U.S.A., and chairs the Executive Committee of the Intellectual Property Law
Section of AALS. She has published extensively on international copyright and related
issues. Prior to her academic work, Professor Jones was an Assistant United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of New York. She received her J.D. from New York
University School of Law.
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with the right. I will note, however, that yesterday as I was pondering
what I would say, I realized that any way I might describe the right of
publicity would certainly conflict with the vision of someone sitting
before you here today. If I were to describe the right of publicity as a
property interest designed to protect the efforts of someone who had
worked hard to develop a particular image, and to allow that individual
to participate in any commercial value that might be realized by someone
else, some members of the panel would object. In a similar manner, if I
were to describe it as a personal right which was designed to protect the
integrity or the dignity of individuals providing them with control over
those circumstances in which their image was used, that description
would conflict with the views of others on our panel. Perhaps the right
of publicity falls somewhere in between those two descriptions.
The most common circumstance in which the right is implicated occurs
when someone wants to use someone else's image in a traditional
advertisement. The right of publicity demands that you get the
permission of that individual before you can use that individual's image.
The right of publicity is a legal remedy of fairly recent origin. Ben
Franklin's image was put on pillboxes and sold outside the Eiffel tower.
He received no royalties for those sales. Nevertheless, the right of
publicity is alive and flourishing in approximately thirty-two states,
either by statute or common law. The absence of case law does not
indicate a rejection of the right. Rather, it is my guess that the
remaining states have not yet considered the issue. The right of publicity
has been expanded or perhaps read more broadly recently in three Ninth
Circuit decisions involving Bette Midler, who sued Ford Motor Company
for using a singer who imitated her voice in one of its commercials; Tom
Waits, who brought a similar kind of suit against Frito-Lay; and Vanna
White, who sued because of a commercial in which a robot turned letters
in a set that looked like the Wheel of Fortune television show.'4 With
that rather modest introduction, let us turn to the hypothetical.
Our hypothetical arises in a nonexistent city in a nonexistent state
controlled by no existing body of law. The state is located somewhere in
the United States so that we do have federal law. We also have the law
in a number of other jurisdictions that we can consider as we attempt to
resolve all of our problems. For wont of another name, we are in Gotham.
Like New York, Gotham is one of the world's centers for art, literature,
media and big business. Like New York, Gotham has recognized the
right of publicity; but, unlike New York, it has recognized the right of
publicity by common law.
14.* The three cases are: Miller v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Waits
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993); and
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 989 F.2d
1512 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
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One reported case in Gotham involved a young woman whose name
was on a bag of flour. She was a private individual. She objected to the
use and brought suit under the common law of Gotham. She was
successful in enjoining future use of the advertisement and she received
damages. For those of you who are familiar with the right of publicity,
a similar suit was brought in New York State; and the plaintiff was
unsuccessful.'" Currently, New York State has only a statutory right of
publicity/privacy. 16 There is not a common law right in New York.1
7
In our hypothetical, Robert Porter, a screenwriter and independent
producer, is interested in making a one-hour docudrama about the life
of Patty Smith, a former ice skater, who won a gold medal in the
Olympics during the 1950's. She was the darling of the Olympics.
Everyone thought well of her. It looked as if she had a bright future.
Unfortunately, someone revealed that she had attended several meetings
of a local chapter of the American Communist Party. As a consequence,
she was blacklisted, unable to obtain coaching jobs, skate with the Ice
Capades or pursue any other kind of employment connected with ice
skating. Smith is now a mechanic in a small town in upstate Gotham.
She is opposed to publicity about her life, has not spoken with anyone
about her past and refuses to do so. Mr. Porter called Ms. Smith on the
phone and asked her if she would participate in the project. She refused
to cooperate.
Mr. Porter continued with the project and contacted a group called Ice
Dreams, Incorporated, the world's largest manufacturer of ice skates. Ice
Dreams volunteered to bankroll the project, but only if it is apparent in
film that Ms. Smith wore their ice skates during her career, and if
someone, during the film, mentions the virtues of Ice Dreams ice skates.
Porter was desperate to make the film, and agreed to Ice Dreams' terms.
Smith heard about the film and Ice Dreams' contract. She became
horribly upset and called her attorney, Jonathan Reichman. Mr.
Reichman, can you help her?
JONATHAN REICHMAN: I would say yes, I can.
JONES: Why?
REICHMAN: I think this is a situation where both privacy and
publicity grants apply. An argument can be made for some publicity
grants in that they have misappropriated an image that she, through her
diligent effort over the years, albeit a number of years ago, worked hard
15.* See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
16.* See N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1992), as amended by Ch. 674, §
1, [Nov. 1, 1995] N.Y. Laws 1665-66 (McKinney).
17.* See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984).
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to create. As a consequence, she does have a property right. Now, at this
point in time, she should be able to control and either exploit or not
exploit as she sees fit. On privacy grants, I would take the position that
she's no longer a celebrity. She's not been in the limelight for fifteen
years. Her "fifteen minutes of fame" have passed and, as a consequence,
she should be able to maintain her privacy, retreat into that privacy, and
be able to restrict other people from violating that privacy.
JONES: Not surprisingly, having received the call from Mr. Reich-
man, Mr. Porter is not about to roll over and sack the project. He calls
up Ms. Handman and says, "So, what do you think? Can I keep going?"
LAURA HANDMAN: I would say yes, you can. The docudrama is to
report on the events that took place very much in the public eye at the
time. She cannot own the events that occurred to her. She does not own
what happened to her. They're historical events and you can proceed
forward. Obviously, you run some risk of libel claims or false light claims
if you falsely portray her, but in terms of a right of publicity, she cannot
stop you from making a newsworthy docudrama about historical facts.
As to the privacy right, and the fact that there's been a passage of time
and she is no longer in the public eye, the fact remains that she perhaps
epitomizes what was a terrible time in our history of blacklisting, and
her story is very much newsworthy then and now as an historical
reflection as to what can happen when there is rampant fear and
blacklisting."5
JONES: Mr. Reichman?
REICHMAN: I would say in response, that with respect to publicity
and false light, there is a false light concern here in the sense that if you
weigh that Porter is planning to play out her life in this docudrama, it
will involve the potential implication that she sponsored or endorsed the
Ice Dreams Company product. Can I ask a question, did she in fact wear
JONES: Yes, she did.
REICHMAN: Okay.
JONES: She did wear Ice Dreams ice-skates.
18.* See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, (2d Cir.) (child prodigy who gained
fame in 1910 and who had since then "cloaked himself in obscurity," was still a subject of
public interest in 1937), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
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REICHMAN: Then, notwithstanding that, to have her life placed in
the context of a program where this entity is a sponsor of the program,
and also to work into it an endorsement of it, albeit by another
character, is to associate her with the product in a way that members of
the public could view it, and would be likely to view the program, as
implying that she endorsed that product or that company and still does.
HANDMAN: I would advise Mr. Porter to craft the script in such a
way as to remain factually accurate and to not imply any endorsement.
I don't think that the mere fact it reports that she wore the skates and
that perhaps there is a reference, obviously not a dominating reference,
but just a reference to how terrific the skates are, would change this
docudrama into an advertisement. Docudramas are sponsored all the
time. All T.V. programs are sponsored by commercial companies pumping
their products and that doesn't convert what is essentially an artistic
work or a news program into an advertisement. I think that some of the
concerns that Mr. Reichman raises can be dealt with in the script so as
to not suggest any implied endorsement by her that might be false.
JONES: Do you think that would be enough, Mr. Reichman?
REICHMAN: I would say that would help to assuage her concern, but
on the other hand, in view of her objective of staying out of the limelight,
of not wanting to be in the public eye, and especially not wanting to be
viewed as connected with any product, that will probably fall short of
what she wants and what she could achieve.
HANDMAN: There could also be a disclaimer that would say that this
was an unauthorized docudrama and make clear that she was not
cooperating in any way and therefore avoid also any suggestion that she
had entered into an agreement with this company to produce this
docudrama.
JONES: If I alter the hypothetical somewhat, do we have the same
legal issues? Let us say for example that our producer's plan wasn't to
produce a docudrama, but rather had been to produce a fictional story
loosely based on the life of another in which the main character, a Ms.
Brown, was a slalom skier who had been blacklisted. Would that make
a difference? Would Ms. Smith be able to bring suit? Or would the
factors that Ms. Handman has emphasized, the conveyance of factual
information, not be as important?
REICHMAN: Are you saying that Ms. Brown's story would only be an
extrapolation of Ms. Smith's story?
[20:1
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JONES: Yes, the story would be based on the life of Ms. Smith. It
would simply make the lead character a skier instead of a skater.
REICHMAN: Well, I think that it would be based on if the average
viewer of the program would be likely to see it as a roman & clef or some
sort of a veiled portrayal of Ms. Smith's life, then I think that Ms. Smith
could maintain the same position and say that adjustments of the facts
would not go far enough to avoid the implication that it's her story being
told, her life being portrayed. If, in fact, it were fictionalized to the
degree where the average viewer of the program would not know it was
her story, then I think it would be a different situation.
JONES: Professor Zimmerman, do you think either story presents a
problem?
PROFESSOR DIANE LEENHEER ZIMMERMAN: Not to me it
doesn't. At least if I were looking at it from the perspective of a film
maker, I don't think it presents a problem. I think it ought to present a
real problem for Ms. Smith and her counsel because it seems to me that
there are a number of inconsistencies that already have come out in the
basic position that is being taken here. On the one hand, this seems to
be a person who has a taste for privacy, quite understandable in light of
her unfortunate prior history, but who nevertheless wants to claim that
she is attempting to exploit her right of publicity or to control how it is
exploited. It seems to me there is an internal intellectual inconsistency
in the position that I want to control my right of publicity, my economic
value, and at the same time I want no one to make any use of it. I think
that this is an area of the law where we have manufactured a set of
cases that serve no useful purpose.
JONES: What are those cases?
ZIMMERMAN: I think the right of publicity and the privacy cases
that involve accurate narrative types of publications.
JONES: Ms. Handman?
HANDMAN: I don't see the shift to fictional work to be a problem at
all in several regards. First of all, the sine qua non of a right of publicity
claim is that the work has to be advertising or trade. Be it a docudrama
or a work of fiction, they are not advertising or trade. They are
expressive works, one more factual than the other, but still not
constituting an advertisement in the sense that we all have come to
understand it. Secondly, most of the statutes are fairly narrow in their
description, certainly in New York. You have to use a name or likeness;
merely evoking the personality or story of someone is not sufficient. In
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the case that I handled for John Guare involving Six Degrees of
Separation, the story of someone masquerading as Sidney Poitier's son
and seeking admission into various New Yorkers' homes, is a true story
about David Hampton.'9 The character was named Paul, not David, and
one of the grounds on which the court dismissed it was the fact that his
name, David Hampton, was not used even though everyone conceded
that the story was based on David Hampton's life and that others
recognized it was David Hampton. I think the question that Mr.
Reichman raises, would people be able to still identify the character,
raises libel issues because if you say something false about the character,
and people are thinking that's really Patty Smith, that can be an issue
when people are identifiable, but in terms of the right of publicity, I don't
have any problem with a fictionalized version of Ms. Smith's life.
JONES: Mr. Reichman.
REICHMAN: I want to respond to a couple of comments with respect
to what Professor Zimmerman said. I don't have a problem in effect
taking a position that at the same time, Ms. Smith wants to preserve a
privacy interest and a property interest, and preserve the right to either
exploit or not exploit as she sees fit. I don't see anything different there
than the owner of a copyrighted work, an artist or author who chooses
to either exploit or to hold back what he or she creates from exploitation.
With respect to Ms. Handman's comment about the fictional work, again,
if we operated from the presumption, as I do, that you have a property
right, if you are going to take someone's persona and put it down either
into something largely biographical or something fictional, again, you are
reaping a commercial benefit from that persona for which the owner of
that persona, I believe, should share in any kind of economic reward.
JONES: Is this a property right? Is he correct, Professor Zimmer-
man? Is this a property right over which she has control?
ZIMMERMAN: Well, I think the question is it a property right is
possibly not the right way to put it. I think the question is really,
"should it be a property right?" It's been recognized as a property right
in a number of states. But I think there's a serious question as to how
valid a claim of property this is. The justifications for saying that there
is this property right strike me as being at least open to serious question.
We don't ordinarily say that people are allowed to own their own identity
and image and prevent other people from using it.




The greatest obstacle, I think, to developing a legal right of privacy as
a general matter is that we allow the interest of the public in informa-
tion about other people to trump any kind of right of privacy practically
that is raised. What is there about a claim like Ms. Smith's that makes
her different from an ordinary private person who would like not to be
written about but really has barely a leg to stand on in a court of law in
raising that kind of claim? Well, what is said is that she's worth
something in a commercial sense. However, it is unclear to me, not that
she may be worth something, but whether that which she is "worth" is
a result of something that she alone has created and if, indeed, it is
entitled to a property protection even if she has created some part of it.
I think that property rights are not natural rights. They don't flow
ineluctably out of some fixed set of circumstances. We conclude as a
society that we want to reward or protect certain kinds of things with
property laws. I find that asking if somebody has a property right as
being a very question-begging kind of place to start. The question is
should they, and why should they.
JONES: Mr. Kurnit.
RICHARD KURNIT: Well I think that there is a personal right which
is the right of privacy. It is violated only by conduct which society views
as so outrageous and malicious and venal as to be despised, and that of
course includes advertising. Beyond advertising, privacy claims are
fundamentally limited to lies and deceit and truthful publication of
embarrassing private facts, which is limited to totally unjustified
intentional infliction of emotional distress by publishing someone's most
personal and private information, causing grievous emotional injury to
a person of normal sensibility."0 Privacy is the personal right to be left
alone where there's absolutely no reasonable social justification for giving
publicity to something, and as Gotham develops its common law, it has
to look to where the line is to be drawn between privacy and the right to
receive information and to engage in social intercourse in a democratic
society. I think Gotham would be well advised to follow the rest of the
country and certainly would be limited by the First Amendment to
restricting that right of privacy to a very small area. Where there is any
reasonable relationship to a discussion of a matter of public importance,
the right of privacy is going to have to give way to the First Amendment.
The hard question, if there is one, is what value Gotham will put on
commercial speech. Whether or not a distinction exists in the year 2020
between so-called commercial speech on the internet and attempts by our
hundred and twenty year old Chief Justice Rehnquist to continue to
classify speech which is primarily directed toward a commercial
20.* See Dean William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
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transaction as being less worthy and therefore not entitled to the same
First Amendment protection - that's going to be our hard issue because
some kind of bright talismanic notion that something is commercial
speech is not going to hold up.
There is also a property right, the right of publicity, and that is the
right to exploit what one creates. And the question for Gotham is do we
willy-nilly give that to just anybody without regard to whether or not
they have imparted any effort and have created something? Or do we
look to copyright law as it's developed into 2020 and has been straight-
ened out (and all Ninth Circuit cases have been overruled) and say
fundamentally that there is a social good in providing a benefit to
someone who through dint of talent and effort (not to be confused with
a letter turner on a game show) creates something that is a recognizable,
quality contribution to the arts. As the federal constitution recognizes,
the public can benefit from exploitation of creation if a copyright
monopoly is provided to encourage the useful arts. If limited to a right
to benefit from the effort that one undertakes, a right of publicity would
not be granted to just anybody who happens through circumstance to
have an image that may have some value. For example, because of some
involvement in a crime, be they the victim or the perpetrator, a person
may become famous. Should this person be granted a reasonable period
of time of exclusive rights to permit economic benefit? Does this person
have the same rights as accrue to a person who has created something
of value by a contribution to the arts or other intellectual property?
Once we have developed the value of the right of publicity, we must
then put the concept of right of publicity up against the First Amend-
ment values, recognizing that, like copyright, it too must give way where
there is a use for purposes of satire, parody, or explication of ideas in the
social interchange under the First Amendment. And then we have this
very narrow claim that one might make for being ripped off in terms of
what they've created under the right of publicity, or being personally
invaded under the right of privacy, and our friend Ms. Smith doesn't
come anywhere near being close to presenting a viable claim.
JONES: Mr. Reichman, people aren't born champion ice skaters. It
takes years of practice, years of hard work, years of development of a
particular ability, just like it takes years to master the craft of writing
a novel. Thus, like Kurt Vonnegut, Ms. Smith has developed her craft,
ice skating, which is about to be exploited by Ms. Handman's client, Mr.
Porter.
KURNIT: He, as I understand it, has no intention of using her
performance, her art or her craft, merely her story, which is incidental
to that effort. If we look to copyright law and the question of whether or
not it is a fair use to exploit something that exists, under the second
factor we look at whether or not the artist would have created it
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independently of licensing or remuneration.2 1 If we were going to use
her performance, assuming that she owned that performance, then we
would have what the United States Supreme Court has mistakenly
called the right of publicity, which is of course, the Zacchini case, our
only Supreme Court teaching on the subject, and it has nothing to do
with the right of publicity.22 Zacchini has to do with where you use
somebody's whole performance, and it provides the basic guiding
principle and defining principle that you cannot use the whole perfor-
mance. Beyond that, it tells us very little. If we use her whole perfor-
mance from some event, then we might be reaping what we haven't sown
and she might be entitled to some compensation. But the story of her
being a victim of blacklisting is not something that she created out of her
intelligence, her art or her craft.
JONES: Mr. Reichman.
REICHMAN: Yes, I agree with the part about the blacklisting being
the toughest part for my client, but I certainly feel comfortable in
treating the right of publicity as we treat copyright rights - as a
property right - that can take precedence over the First Amendment.
And I think picking up on something that I answered earlier in terms of
taking the question that there is a property right, I think that like so
many rights in our society, they follow as a result of commercial and
marketplace realities; the right that was laid down by Brandeis in his
article, that, I think was a reflection of evolving commercial reality.
23
I think what you have here in this day and age is a situation that you
have TV movies, docudramas, that are very, very big bucks commercial
properties and I feel that it is entirely appropriate for someone who has
invested the effort in building up a career to be able to share and take
advantage and control that. I make a distinction between TV movies and
theatrical motion pictures on the one hand and books on the other. In the
book field, the marketplace will support an authorized biography and the
unauthorized biography, whereas I think the TV movie field is more of
a one shot thing, unless you're dealing with a unique situation like Amy
Fisher where you've got three simultaneous TV movies at the same time.
This may be the only opportunity for her to reap the benefit of her life
story, and once it's done by Mr. Porter that may be it, and there may be
no further commercial opportunity available.
21.* 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
22.* Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
23.* Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
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KURNIT: You really believe she's earned society's protection of her
right to benefit from shooting someone in the face?
REICHMAN: Who are you talking about, Amy Fisher?
KURNIT: That's her only accomplishment and contribution to society
that I'm aware of .... [Laughter]
REICHMAN: I was thinking more of just Joey Buttafuoco's contribu-
tions to society.
JONES: Mr. Porter has been terribly intrigued by the fact that we are
approaching a new millennium. He would like to use some new
technologies in his docudrama. He turned to Mr. Winsten, who's the CEO
of Technologies Tomorrow for advice, consultation and assistance. Mr.
Winsten, can you help us? Can you give him (and us) some ideas?
STAN WINSTEN: I could show you. Could you dim the lights? I
could tell you what's technologically possible. The first two commercials
I'm going to show you are the Reebok spots we did, the "Shaq vs. Shaq"
commercials. I don't know if any of you have seen them, but what's
particularly unique about these two commercials is that we cyber-
scanned through the use of an infrared laser a 3-D model of Shaq's head,
and believe it or not, we were able to find nine seven foot body doubles
that could play basketball and we basically cloned the 3-D model of
Shaq's head, with his cooperation, and composited it onto the body
double. Let me just show you.
[Video footage of Reebok, "Shaq vs. Shaq" commercial shown]
WINSTEN: There was a segment on Dateline NBC of how this was
done, I think a picture speaks a thousand words."
[Dateline NBC segment shown on video]2'
WINSTEN: Okay, a couple of things I want to say about this before
we go on to the next segment. The blue screen and the green screen
photography shot of the bench is similar to the technique you see
everyday with your weatherman in front of the weather map. Basically,
visual images are broken up into red, blue and green wavelengths, and
what blue and green screen photography does is electronically make
24.* Dateline NBC, Profile: State of the Art; how commercial featuring nine Shaquille




those certain colors disappear, and you can photograph images and then
digitally composite those images into any background footage. But what
was more difficult in this particular commercial was the fact that there
was physical contact. With respect to the special effects for Last Action
Hero, you may recall, there were all these scenes with Arnold Schwarz-
enegger, but if you recall the film, for those few of you who have seen it,
they never actually made contact.
What was so difficult with this project is you had people playing
basketball really fast and hard and they were touching each other and
it was impossible to digitally composite Shaq in each shot and actually
have them make contact. And that was the necessity for the 3-D model
of his head. The only reason it worked under today's technology was the
fact you saw Shaq's head in a background shot and it was there for a
second or two, but even with this cyber-scanned infrared laser mapping
3-D model technique, it was impossible to get all the imperfections of the
cyberscanned face. Luckily, he shaves his head, but if we were dealing
with somebody with a nice mane of hair, it would have been very
difficult to get life-like looking hair. Nor, if it was a close-up shot could
we have been able to pick up pores in a face or scars or lines; the face
close-up would have had a very mannequin-like look and quality to it, so
it worked in this particular scene. I should also note that we can't
currently do this with the whole body for the same reasons.
In a technique you'll see later on called motion capture, we can
capture in real-time organic movement, and give that organic or life-like
movement to synthetic or computer generated imagery, but you can't
pick up hairs on legs, creases as a leg bends and a lot of other things
that would really give it away.
The next two spots I'm going to show you are very well known Diet
Coke commercials. They've been called the "Dead Actor" commercials.
The first one is called Night Club with Elton John playing with Louis
Armstrong. Jimmy Cagney's in it, Humphrey Bogart and someone else.
The second one was much more difficult, that's the Paula Abdul dance
spot, where she's dancing with Gene Kelly. What was much more
difficult about the second spot as you'll see, since I did not bring a how-to
spot, was that Paula Abdul had to learn the exact dance steps of the
Gene Kelly footage that was extrapolated out of, I think Anchors Aweigh,
where he was dancing with Frank Sinatra, and they're dancing side by
side. You'll see that there's no actual physical contact during the dance.
You'll also see Cary Grant pour a bottle of Diet Coke towards the end of
the spot. The footage that we actually used after going through hundreds
and hundreds of hours of film footage was Cary Grant pouring a
champagne bottle. We matted out the champagne bottle and were able
to substitute in a Diet Coke bottle, but under current technology we
couldn't have made Cary Grant with archival footage perform an action
that he hadn't done in the archival footage, so take a look at those spots
.... Why, isn't this going. [Laughter]
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[Video footage of two Diet Coke commercials shown]
WINSTEN: All the lines that the dead actors said, with the exception
of Gene Kelly (I believe he's still alive, is that correct? [Yes.]) were their
actual words from archival films. I'm sure everybody in the room has
seen Forrest Gump. ILM, i.e. Industrial Light and Magic, George Lucas'
special effects company, took this process one step further. He put Tom
Hanks in archival footage with Lyndon Baines Johnson and whoever
else, and what they did was they used a digital retouching technique to
manipulate the mouths of the famous people depicted in the footage with
Tom Hanks and then they lip-synched in conversation directly with Tom
Hanks, which was taking this particular technology to the next level.25
The other way they could have done that is if they had access to the
individuals that they wanted to say things other than what they had
originally said, they could shoot a lot of footage, and then through
hundreds and hundreds of quick edits, you could manipulate the mouth
to make it look like somebody was saying something they actually didn't
say.
The next thing I'm going to show you is a little ten second spot from
some work we did on Woody Allen's film Zelig. In this situation, we shot
original footage of Woody Allen and we digitally composited it in archival
footage with Babe Ruth. We also did some of the special effects for the
feature film In the Line of Fire. In that film, we digitally composited
Clint Eastwood in archival footage of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon
Baines Johnson, but the problem was that we couldn't find any archival
footage of Clint Eastwood that exactly fit the circumstances of him being
a secret service agent, so you'll see how we digitally altered Clint
Eastwood's appearance from archival footage before we composited it into
the archival footage with John F. Kennedy.
[Video of scene from Zelig shown]
WINSTEN: That's Babe Ruth in the front.
[Video segment from Entertainment Tonight explaining In the
Line of Fire special effects shown]2"
25.* See Dateline NBC, Profile: State of the Art; Industrial Light and Magic, computer
graphics company, creates effects for Forrest Gump, (NBC television broadcast, August 2,
1994), transcript available at 1994 WL 3764484; Dateline NBC, Profile: State of the Art;
Actor Tom Hanks appears with President Kennedy in Forrest Gump via high-tech
cinematography, (NBC television broadcast June 30, 1994), transcript available at 1994 WL
3764588.
26.* No transcript is available for this segment from Entertainment Tonight.
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WINSTEN: Next I'm going to show you a Revlon "Revolutionary
Color" spot we did with footage of Claudia Schiffer. The digital program-
mer that worked on this was looking at Claudia Schiffer for about four
weeks without stopping, until they actually ended up having to put him
in an oxygen tent. [Laughter] We thought he had hyperventilated. But
you'll see that the digital manipulations that we did in this spot are very
similar to what we did with Clint Eastwood in In the Line of Fire. We
actually matched up her lip color and her dress color to samples that
Revlon gave us. We didn't shoot her with different lipsticks and different
dress colors and then composite her in. We took footage and then
digitally manipulated all of the lip and dress colors that you see. Another
note on In the Line of Fire - that feature film sat on the shelf for about
eight or nine years because the technology wasn't there to composite JFK
with Clint Eastwood as a secret service agent thirty years before.
Similarly that's one of the reasons why Forrest Gump took nine or ten
years to get made also.
[Video of Revlon's "Revolutionary Color" commercial shown.]
WINSTEN: Alright now here's how it was done.
[Video segment showing how images were composited.]
WINSTEN: Okay, this is the last thing I'm going to show you. This
is the most cutting edge technique for capturing motion and translating
it to computer generated imagery, so that the computer generated
imagery moves in a life-like fashion with all the imperfections of human
movement, because in traditional cell animation or computer-generated
imagery, it looks very robotic. This particular technique utilizes a system
called the "Flock of Birds," which captures real-life human movement
and translates that movement to a wireframe computer-generated image.
[Video of Shell Oil commercial with dancing cars and
Dateline NBC segment describing "motion capture"
techniques shown.]27
WINSTEN: Okay that's it. [Applause.] If you can get Mikhail
Baryshnikov then we can get a car that dances like he dances, or if we
can get Michael Jordan, then we can get a computer generated image to
dunk basketballs and jumps the way he jumps, etc. I thought that these
examples were illustrative of ascribing the likeness or physical character-
27.* Dateline NBC, Profile: State of the Art; special effects used in television
advertisements, (NBC television broadcast, August 30, 1994), transcript available at 1994
WL 3764538.
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istics of somebody well-known to a computer generated image. If Walter
Brennan were still alive - you recall that funny-like limp that he had
from the Real McCoys, if you remember that show - we could ascribe
some of the physical characteristics of his gait to a computer generated
character using the motion capture technique.
JONES: Back to Mr. Porter and Ms. Smith. Mr. Porter was enchanted
with opportunities offered by Mr. Winsten. He's decided to use technolo-
gy and have the role of Ms. Smith played by Heather Woods. Heather
Woods also was an Olympic skater in 1950. She skated at the same time
as Ms. Smith. Ms. Woods died in 1953. Before her death she was able to
transform her career as an Olympic skater into a career as a Hollywood
star. There is a large amount of film footage of Heather Woods skating,
talking, acting, moving around. Ms. Woods will star in the docudrama as
Ms. Smith. Mr. Anderson, Heather Woods' daughter comes to you deeply
upset. Ms. Woods, the skater, hated communism. Under no circumstance
does the daughter want her mother starring in the role of a communist.
Can you help her?
KEN ANDERSON: I believe so. At least in this jurisdiction, I think
I might be able to. I would say that the right of publicity here exists at
least for a reasonable period of time after the death of the person
portrayed. It is a right which the heirs should have standing to assert for
a number of important commercial reasons, and also because in Gotham
we want to encourage people who are creative, people who we want to
devote careers to the pursuit of artistic matters. To achieve this
encouragement, we must provide not only for the performer but for the
heirs as well. Assuming that our jurisdiction, Gotham, is an important
center of arts and commerce, this public policy should be controlling.
JONES: Can you give us a little bit of background about the
possibility of someone actually being able to use existing state law to
assert a publicity claim for an individual who is dead?
ANDERSON: I would only say generally there is a great variation in
the ability to do so. There is new legislation in a number of states and
there is almost any possible combination of conditions precedent to an
estate asserting rights. There may be a time limitation involved; it may
be fifty years or one hundred years after death. There may or may not
be a condition precedent of exploitation either during the course of the
celebrity's lifetime or perhaps even a second chance for the estate to
exploit the personality and publicity aspects for a period of time after
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death in order to get that right. But the key, I think, to my mind, is that
it varies fairly widely. The law of publicity is by no means uniform."
JONES: Mr. Reichman, New York law.
MR. REICHMAN: New York law does not recognize a post mortem
right of publicity. To the extent there is a right of publicity, that is part
of the New York privacy statute sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights
Law. 9
JONES: Tennessee, with Elvis Presley?
REICHMAN: In Tennessee, I believe, there is a limited post mortem
right; limited in the sense of years you have to exploit. I think it's within
ten years after death, and once it is exploited if you continue to add, sort
of like a trademark statute, as long as you keep exploiting it the right
remains in effect.30 If you stop doing it for, I think it's two years, there
is a prima facie assumption of loss of rights, the two year trademark
abandonment provision of the Lanham Act.31
JONES: And can someone help us and describe California Law?
REICHMAN: California follows the copyright law of life plus fifty.
32
KURNIT: If the Ninth Circuit hasn't been reversed by a Municipal
Court Judge in the State of California, and mistakenly the state courts
have left to the Ninth Circuit the determination of state law, then the
common law right of publicity enunciated in Midler, Waits, and White
would suggest that if anybody out there happens to have a passing
thought about a particular celebrity in watching a work, if it's deemed
to be commercial, however that's defined, there would be a violation of
the right of persona.33 We'll have to see whether or not the California
state courts will determine that the Ninth Circuit is correct to ignore the
California legislature's statement of the law in the Celebrity Rights Act
of 1985 and to develop an unbounded common law right of publicity. But
this being 2020, by now French jurisprudence with respect to droit
morale has completely swept the country and the Lanham Act has been
28.* See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. h (1995).
29.* See supra note 16.
30.* TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (Michie 1988).
31.* 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (definition of "abandoned"). As a result of the Uruguay
Round Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4981 (1994), the term for prima fade
nonuse under the federal trademark law will become three years, effective January 1, 1996.
32.* CAL. CIV. CODE § 990(g) (Deering 1994).
33.* See supra note 14.
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amended to provide for rights of attribution and integrity. Our best shot
is in arguing some ill-defined concept of an extension of copyright law in
the choreography and in the performance as well as marrying it to the
Zacchini case and arguing that "they took the whole performance." This
seems to be the guiding principle of this other kind of common law right
of publicity. You may be able to argue a Lanham Act claim that there is
a false implication of authorization, participation, or association by the
estate in terms of lending itself to this film and therefore a violation of
the rights of the estate. I would advise Ms. Woods' heirs to incorporate
as the Estate of Heather Woods, to develop trademark rights, and to
develop the ability to argue that the public has come to understand that
the estate is in the business of exploiting their dead relatives, and
therefore anyone who sees one of their dead relatives should assume that
the estate is in charge here and is benefitting from it. In the realm of the
Lanham Act, and conceivably droit morale and copyright, Zacchini may
finally be put to rest.
JONES: Well, in fact, that's just the case. Woods sold skating outfits
when she was alive; her family's been selling skating outfits since her
death. There is a picture of Woods on the label that is sold with her
skating outfits. Professor McLean, does she have a trademark claim?
Does the Lanham Act cover this?
PROFESSOR WILLAJEANNE MCLEAN: Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act deals effectively with this situation. It says, loosely
paraphrased, that any person, who, on or in connection with any goods
or services . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation or association of such person with another
shall be liable.. .3' Ms. Woods, and/or her heirs, could say emphatically
that she would not be a party to this portrayal. Furthermore, based on
the provisions of §43(a), it could be contended that the performance is a
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (1994) which states, in pertinent part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable
in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she
is likely to be damaged by such act.
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misrepresentation."5 Therefore, Mr. Porter should not be allowed to use
Ms. Woods' performance or her persona in order to portray Ms. Smith,
someone whom Ms. Woods detested.
HANDMAN: I think, though, that Mr. Porter might be well advised
to use Ms. Woods' performance in another way and not use her as a
substitute for Ms. Smith. Perhaps he should use her in a manner that
was used in Forrest Gump. In this way, she would appear in part of the
story as herself. I think that would be fine.
ANDERSON: I have another suggestion. If Woods had appeared in
motion pictures, I would suggest that we advise that the producer obtain
a license of the motion picture footage used and integrate that into the
movie. It's likely in many instances that she would waive any moral
right or any right under the Lanham Act to make a claim as a part of
the agreement that she entered into when she performed the role. This
includes the right to make a claim respecting editing and changes to a
portion of the performance, no matter how significant and no matter how
used, in whatever context, including morphing and creating an entirely
new persona out of it. That's what I'd look for, because then I think any
claim that there's an independent right that exists notwithstanding the
fact that this performance was fixed in a tangible medium, that it was
licensed, that all rights were waived, I think begins to run into a number
of problems such as preemption." If there is a valid license under
copyright, perhaps you're now trying to create the equivalent of a
copyright right and flying in the face of another party's rights under the
copyright law and the commercial practices of the industry.
JONES: What if we utilize the footage in the manner that Mr.
Anderson has suggested? She will walk on and perform during an
Olympic competition. As you recall, she did perform in Olympic
competitions during the period when Ms. Smith was at her prime. Is Mr.
Porter vulnerable to suit, Mr. Anderson?
ANDERSON: I think he's in better shape than before. If I were
representing the estate I certainly would be most interested in pursuing
the Lanham Act issue if she's being connected with this picture when
there was no original factual connection whatever. However, I think
there are still some problems even with some factual connection.
35. See generally Diana Elzey Pinover, The Rights of Authors, Artists and Performers
Under Section 43(a) of The Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 38, 54-63 (1993) (discussing
the use of Section 43(a) in considering right of publicity claims).
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
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JONES: Mr. Reichman?
REICHMAN: I agree.
JONES: Why would there be any problems? This is an accurate
statement. She skated, so did Ms. Smith.
REICHMAN: In a different context. She is now being transplanted
into a different work, a different product environment, that I think does
create the potential of a misrepresentation.
KURNIT: No. We didn't take the whole performance. [Laughter]
ANDERSON: I'm not sure you have to take the whole performance.
It was hard to take Zacchini's performance without taking the whole
performance, I would say.
KURNIT: Zacchini was a human cannonball. And a local news
program in talking about how the circus had come to town showed Mr.
Zacchini's entire act of being shot out of the cannon and safely landing.
He sued claiming that now that people knew how his act ended (would
there otherwise be greater suspense or mystery?), nobody would come
and see it. The Supreme Court, faced with this issue, basically said that
Ohio seems to call this a right of publicity. Since we here in the Supreme
Court know next to nothing about copyright, we will go along with that
and dub it the right of publicity, and since they showed Zacchini's whole
act, it's not fair. That's the overall principle, and I invite you to read the
case.37 It seems to be that it's not a fair use, and it is a violation of
Zacchini's rights because they took the whole act. It was sort of a
melding of copyright notions.
REICHMAN: It wasn't preempted because Mr. Zacchini was not fixed
in a tangible medium of expression, which, I guess as long as he lands
in the net, he's not going to be.
[Laughter]
HANDMAN: The entire act took fifteen seconds from start to finish.
I have a problem with the notion that if you use Ms. Woods' performance
in a historical way in the movie as being who she was, an Olympic
performer, that anyone would think that there was an implied endorse-
ment of a product. I think that's quite different than the Coke ads we
saw, which I think arguably do raise the question of implied endorse-
37.* Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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ment by the estates of the deceased stars of a product, mainly Coca-Cola.
I think that's very different.
JONES: Professor McLean?
MCLEAN: I would like to know how much of the performance would
be used. There's a case where James Brown sued the owners/distributors
of the movie, The Commitments.3" James Brown sued because portions
of one of his performances, approximately twenty-seven seconds worth,
were used in the movie. In addition, the characters in the movie
mentioned him by name. James Brown argued, inter alia, that the use
of his name, likeness and persona was a violation of his right of
publicity. The court determined that the use of Brown's "persona" did not
rise to the level of actionable appropriation; rather, it was de minimis.39
Under those circumstances, it does not seem possible that Ms. Wood
has a cause of action here, particularly where she is not playing the role
of Ms. Smith, but is just skating on and off the screen. How does that
pose a problem?
KURNIT: I think it would pose a real problem if we prohibit using
material accurately, where there is a reasonable relationship to the
subject matter, in a work of art. People cannot prevent communication
about themselves that is truthful and accurate, that is a contribution to
art as well as public discussion under the First Amendment. In these
circumstances, the First Amendment rights are, to my mind, overwhelm-
ing as opposed to any assertion of any other claims we might otherwise
develop.
ANDERSON: Where are you now where you have the crossover into
pure entertainment and pure artistic expression - performer, musician,
a dancer - and I don't think you can so easily say that you're telling
news or that there's a First Amendment right to relate back to events.
After all, the actor creates a character in a role, so I suppose you could
say it's an event. Then why can't everyone simply use that for free
forever? It goes back to the concept that in order to sustain an
environment where the arts are fostered you have to have a reward at
the end of the rainbow for the creative people. So wherever you've got
that kind of labor involved you must look for that.
38. See Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166 (D. D.C. 1992)
(granting summary judgment to defendants), affd, 15 F.3d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(unpublished disposition).
39. See Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 172 (holding that a single use of Brown's name did
"not constitute the type of wholesale appropriation that has been recognized as giving rise
to a right-of-publicity claim.").
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REICHMAN: I agree. I keep coming back to copyright analogy. In this
docudrama, if they want to use music from the fifties period, period
songs to invoke the era, they're going to have to pay for them. If they
want to use the performance - even part of the performance of another
skater - I think that they should be required to pay for that and receive
permission. I think, following up on the copyright analogy, you can
incorporate a fair use doctrine in that if the portion you're taking of the
performance is sufficiently de minimis, then maybe ultimately the
contribution of that performance portion is sufficiently small enough so
that there should be an exemption. But certainly as a matter of basic
principle, I follow the copyright analogy.
KURNIT: Well, if I get you guys to give me full First Amendment
protection and fair use protection on the right of publicity, I go home
happy.
ZIMMERMAN: I'd like to know how you define a performance. I
mean, were John Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson performing in
that segment that we saw from the film? Because if that is the case,
then it seems to me that you would never be able to use any kind of
historical footage in a later production, fiction or otherwise. And that
does seem to be a bit of a problem. So unless you can define performance
for me in a way that is somewhat narrower, that would avoid leading us
to conclude that Lyndon Baines Johnson and John F. Kennedy had their
right of publicity violated by appearing in that film, I would be a little
worried about it.
REICHMAN: I think that politicians create a hard example here.
Since they have in effect by becoming involved in the public sector and
dedicating themselves from a career standpoint (supposedly) to public
service, there's arguably more of a concession or dedication type of
analogy that comes into play. And I guess it's just a question of line
drawing between something that falls under the arena of traditional
entertainment, performance and public figures who may be acting in the
sphere of their businesses but just who happened to be captured on film
like Lyndon Baines Johnson or John F. Kennedy.
KURNIT: Can I get you to throw Amy Fisher in? How about a letter
turner on a game show? Are we within the realm of people whose
creative contributions society should not hold up above First Amendment
values?
REICHMAN: I have to say maybe it's a function of my having
practiced in California, but I feel very comfortable with the California
line of cases. I continue to feel that if people are going to reap commer-
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cial benefits from this type of exploitation, they should be required to pay
for it.
JONES: I want to go back to an earlier question. If Ms. Wood is dead,
should her daughter be able to bring suit against Mr. Porter? She can't
be particularly worried about her image. Ms. Handman, do you think the
state of Gotham should recognize the descendibility of the publicity
right?
HANDMAN: Well, I think one problem is that we need to respect that
at moments in time, people and events pass into history and therefore
become in the public domain. In the libel context, by analogy, the
deceased person cannot sue because they have passed into the realm of
history. And maybe death is a somewhat arbitrary line drawing because
obviously the family members don't think that so much time has passed
and that their reputations don't matter, but it's a line that we draw, and
I think a suitable line also for the right of publicity where it is recog-
nized.
ANDERSON: I think you're looking at the difference between a tort
and a property right. There is a different rationale behind it.
HANDMAN: Well, that's where we perhaps disagree whether this is
properly viewed as a property right or not.
ANDERSON: I think a lot of it has to do with, what's the reason for
it? Why are we creating this? What's the purpose of creating this law?
HANDMAN: I think, you know, the more you stray from its core
purpose which is to prevent false, implied endorsements - which is what
I think is really at the core and the value of the right to publicity,
suggesting that someone is endorsing Coca-Cola when they don't intend
to - when you stray from that pure value which is really the commercial
value and get into story, books, entertainment, whatever it may be,
about a person, I think you've gotten away from the commercial value
and you're starting to head into the very strong First Amendment
interests that apply. I think that similarly, with the right of publicity,
the argument goes, and I think these are perhaps good examples for
Coca-Cola, that these are humorous and these people have become
cultural icons and they have reaped the rewards, unlike politicians.
They've reaped the rewards during their lifetimes. So I don't think that
they necessarily need more incentive after their death to have commer-
cialized their image.
ANDERSON: It's hard to believe that we would not have a copyright
law which has protection after the death of the author.
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HANDMAN: That's the act of creation. That's something different
than your personality and who you are.
REICHMAN: Isn't the philosophy behind it the same in the idea that
you are rewarding effort and initiative?
HANDMAN: But to the extent that they have created something, they
are rewarded.
ZIMMERMAN: On the copyright model, they would be protected only
for the actual expression that they fixed. To the extent that what we're
doing with the right of publicity is giving people some sort of amorphous
and very broad right well beyond "expression" that we justify by saying
we are protecting their effort or labor, it seems to me it doesn't fit with
a copyright analogy at all.4' If we use a copyright analogy, maybe the
Zacchini case has something to teach us after all. At least what was
being protected there was a captured performance. You could say that
this person went out there to do a particular act which he normally sold
the right to see. If somebody takes the performance of his entire act as
opposed to taking his physical image or his vocal style or some other
attribute, then maybe that's a bit like violating a copyright. If we want
to think about protecting something like that, we could fit it into the
same set of justifications and narrow principles that copyright has long
abided by and I think thrives under.
MCLEAN: Maybe we should look at it from a trademark perspective.
Once a trademark reaches such a level of popularity that it becomes
synonymous with the good it represents, it is deemed generic.4 Once
generic, a registered trademark no longer qualifies for protection.42 It
is free to be used by all.
Similarly, one could say that at some point, a popular cultural icon, a
popular figure, reaches such a level of popularity, and has so captured
the public's imagination that it becomes synonymous with what it
40.* See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359
(1991) (copyright protects originality rather than the "sweat of the brow").
41. A term is deemed generic when it refers to a type or class of goods; for example,
the term "safari" is generic for expedition into the African wilderness. See Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (defining generic terms). A
mark can also become generic through usage; for example, the term "aspirin" was once a
trademark. See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
42. See § 14(3) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (1994) (allowing cancellation
of registered marks which have become generic).
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represents and it, too, becomes generic.' Therefore, the icon no longer
needs protection." It has reaped the benefits of popularity. It has been
used, talked about, and has entered into the popular culture lexicon. It
should be used.'
KURNIT: I think you have a trademark at least in the sense of the
extensions of the Lanham Act in false implication of endorsement or
authorization cases. That's going to be there and that protects one side.
And you have a copyright law, and that protects a great deal of what
we're talking about here, except to the extent of the performer or the
performer's heirs who are trying now to evade the fact that they didn't
retain the copyright. They might have retained an interest in the
copyright and they didn't. Now they are trying to create another right
which will interfere with the copyright owner's ability to license his
property. The question is how you balance the rights. I dare say we have
to leave Amy Fisher out because her celebrity does not arise out of any
contribution to society.
I think that the problems inherent in the Ninth Circuit's decision in
White become clear where the Court talks about the importance of
expanding the common law right of publicity because actors and artists,
through dint of their talent and hard work, develop something of value
in society, and then they apply it to Vanna White.46 So they're going
down the right road, but then there's this unbelievable awe that we have
about celebrities and we ignore why there are celebrities. So at least let's
limit our right to publicity to those people who have created through dint
of hard effort some kind of performance, as in Zacchini or maybe some
quasi-copyrighted character as in the Marx Brothers, and say this is
something that someone has created which we will permit him to
43. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent
Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 865 (1995)
(noting that "at some point some aspect of a celebrity may transcend his or her own persona
and become evocative of a more general, if not generic concept.").
44. Id., at 865 (noting that it would be inappropriate to protect a "generic persona"
under the right of publicity). See also Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity:
Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDozo ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 365, 370 (1992) (arguing that the celebrity image is overly, and indefensibly, protected
since the image is a "form of cultural bricolage").
45. See David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1981, at 147, 165 (noting the negative effects of over-protection thusly: "[als access
to the public domain is choked, or even closed off altogether, the public loses.., the rich
heritage of its culture, the rich presence of new works derived from that culture and the
rich promise of works to come."); accord, Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and
Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws & Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853
(1991) (discussing the often negative impact of intellectual property laws on creativity).
46.* See White, 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (question of fact for the jury), reh'g
denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.) (Kozinski, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443
(1993).
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exclusively exploit for fifty years. But let's not impinge on copyright, and
let's be informed by copyright concepts of fair use so we don't let
publicity rights become the tool used by people who wish to obstruct
discussion of their lives or commentary and criticism of their lives. The
right of publicity will be abused if we are not sensitive to how we develop
it.
HANDMAN: Rick, I just have to take issue, I think, with endowing
a court with the power to judge between low art and high art ....
KURNIT: They can judge one shade of blue from another according
to Justice Breyer.4 7 Give me an alternative.
HANDMAN: You know, perhaps Vanna White on the east coast
doesn't hold quite the same important symbolism that she does on the
west coast, but I just don't think we can get into that kind of line
drawing of who's a valid celebrity and who's an illegitimate one.
KURNIT: I already got it. I'm trying to get these guys further over to
our place. You and I are going to leave and say, you know, anything
short of the rankest commercial speech is totally protected by the First
Amendment and if it's a docudrama, we're going to shut out the right of
publicity entirely.
JONES: I want to give the audience the opportunity to participate in
the conversation. But before I open the conversation, one last issue I'd
like to discuss is the great disparity in protection we see in different
jurisdictions. Should we have federal legislation? Would it provide
needed uniformity on issues such as what is and is not protected;
whether the right is descendible; how long it descends; and what you
have to establish in order to assert a descendible right?
KURNIT: Well, I think it would make sense because, first of all, it
gives us the opportunity to throw out the Ninth Circuit cases. [Laugh-
ter] Well, I commend them to you for their logic and reasoning. What we
have now is a grab bag that's becoming slightly unseemly. I mean, the
Nevada legislature enacted a right of publicity statute at the behest of
the agents for several dead people and it specifies that Nevada will apply
its law regardless of what law is applicable.' And this kind of attempt
to find friendly legislatures to pass a statute will then inhibit communi-
cation on a national level. These agents will tell you "we will sue in
47.* See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995) (color alone
may, in some cases, entitle one to a trademark).
48.* NEv. REv. STAT. 597.780 (Michie 1994).
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Nevada" when you're using a person whose rights of publicity don't exist
under the applicable law. The New York Court of Appeals has said that
the applicable principles and law should be where the estate is. (In the
case of a use in New York of Tennessee Williams, who lived in New
York, they said they would apply Florida law where he went to die - as
so many New Yorkers do because Florida has no estate tax).49 The
copyright law is a national law and preempts state law in order to
facilitate national publications. Similarly, it would be appropriate for the
right of publicity to be national and to avoid this kind of activity. The
only problem I have is that those people who seem to have seized the
Restatement actually think the Vanna White case is correct.5 °
HANDMAN: As the only member of this panel that currently resides
in Newt Gingrich's Washington, I would, while it may be appropriate,
not want to see Congress at the moment muck around with the right of
publicity.
ZIMMERMAN: I have to say I'd like to know what's going to be in the
law before I say whether I want [laughter] the package. But I'd like to
say that I think that maybe it would be an awful lot of effort for
absolutely nothing because, as I was watching the footage on the screen,
I began to think that what we were really seeing here is the beginnings
of technological obsolescence for the human performer, and that all of
this may be somewhat irrelevant in the year 2020 - that we may have
all of these computer-generated dancing cars and telephone booths and
people and what have you, and we won't need to worry anymore about
those individuals investing time and energy building up their rights of
publicity. We're going to have totally made up characters who will
become our cultural icons of the future. Mickey Mouse as a genuine
appearing-human virtual human-being.
REICHMAN: I would recommend a federal statute. We are talking
about rights that are exploited on a national level. You might think that,
as a practical matter, advertisers who are worried about these concerns
have to assume the worst-case scenario because they will be exploiting
their ads on a national level. I would analogize to the trademark law or
the copyright law. I think, historically, trademark law was rooted in
common law, and I think that, for sheer efficiency and the way the
marketplace operates, it made sense to have federal trademark law. I
think the same principles apply to the rights of publicity.
49.* Southeast Bank, N.A. v. Lawrence, 489 N.E.2d 744 (N.Y. 1985).
50.* See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46-49 (1995).
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JONES: Thank you very much. I'd like to turn to the audience.
[Audience claps.] Is there someone in the audience who would like to
participate in the conversation and ask a question of our panelists?
QUESTIONER: I wonder if anyone on the panel thinks that the film-
makers of Forrest Gump should have gotten permission from the
Kennedy and Johnson estates?
HANDMAN: I don't.
ZIMMERMAN: I don't either.
KURNIT: No.
QUESTIONER: Politicians are in the public domain?
HANDMAN: It's a work of art. I don't consider it advertising and
trade.
REICHMAN: I suppose I'm the one [on the panel] who should come
closest to saying that they should [ask for permission], but again, I think
in connection with politicians, I am comfortable with the idea that there's
a dedication; that it could be exploited without permission from the
estates.
KURNIT: Note that there were several other people standing around
the politicians in that movie who had done nothing to make themselves
public or otherwise. I don't think it's a question of politicians being in the
public domain. For me, in the first instance, it's a work of art, and as
long as it's got anything to do with the work of art, I don't believe the
right of publicity is implicated, and it has really very little to do with
someone being a political figure. If I were free to make my choice, I'd
give even Newt Gingrich more rights than Amy Fisher.
JONES: Let me ask the question, what if we take it out of the movie
and have a poster advertising the movie, for example, a poster with JFK
and Tom Hanks? Will it be a commercial context, exploiting this movie?
HANDMAN: If it's a clip from the movie then I think it's an
incidental use promoting the movie as it was used in the movie, and it
won't be a violation of the right of publicity.5 1
51.* See Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dep't 1975), af'd, 352




ANDERSON: I think you have a danger that you're taking, maybe
taking, at some point, you may be taking someone's de minimis
appearance or otherwise historical context out of context, turning it into
an endorsement that would never have been intended and involved a
whole new different set of rights. Whether that's possible, you're coming
so close to First Amendment freedoms when you're talking about
political, a political person, a President, that the issue becomes much,
much hazier to pinpoint, I think, when the First Amendment concerns
overwhelm just about any use that you'd make.
QUESTIONER: Just to follow up on that same thing, I wonder, how
would Richard and the other [panelists] feel about whether the clearance
of the film-maker had to be obtained in the Johnson and Kennedy uses,
with the copyright owner of the film.
HANDMAN: I think the clip was so short, first of all, that I think it
would come under fair use.
ANDERSON: I'm not sure. I think you said in the analysis of, if
you're looking at a clip, the analysis as to whether it's fair use would
depend on whether you were having an effect on the market value and
if you are usurping what would ordinarily be a license. That is, if the
film-owner regularly licensed clips from that film for those purposes, I
think you have a copyright problem. But as to whether there's a fair use,
I'm not sure. In a commercial exploitation, there are other sources that
could have licensed it.
KURNIT: I would call it a fair use, but the errors and omissions
carrier is going to want you to get a license before going ahead.
QUESTIONER: I have a question directed to the panel, but particu-
larly to Mr. Anderson. I know that your firm is heavily involved with
representing entertainment clients, particularly on the west coast, and
given the death of the studio system and the emergence of the free agent
system for movie stars, are you finding that artists are reserving to
themselves the right for future uses of their performances?
ANDERSON: Well, obviously if we're representing the artists, we try
and do that. If we're representing the production company, we try and
prevent that from happening. It's really a matter of bargaining power at
this point and probably for a very long time into the future will be, if you
have an artist with extreme leverage and bargaining power, a great
superstar, there will be a very substantial reservation of ancillary rights
in all categories, whether they are well known today, such as merchan-
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dising, typical merchandising rights, all the way through the interactive
technologies, all the way through the very latest and technologies
unknown. But if it's your first picture, I think you can waive all of those
goodbye until the union has the ability to negotiate those on your behalf.
REICHMAN: My understanding is that it is, in a number of contracts,
becoming part of the language. There was an interesting situation I
think involving the movie, The Crow with Brandon Lee, who died during
the filming, and the studio ended up manipulating some of the existing
footage to sort of fill in the blanks of the scenes. And they had to go back
to the estate of, I think to his mother, to get permission to do that.
Maybe that was mandated by the errors and omissions carrier. But they
felt that contractually they were not on solid footing so they did, they did
go back.
KURNIT: There is an "errors and omissions insurance." The movie
industry tends to defer to the insurance company's extraordinary
conservatism on these issues.
QUESTIONER: A question directed to the practitioners about the
past, and the contracts under which actors performed in the studio
system here. To what extent do those contracts preclude claims against
use and new technologies today? We had the discussion about the skater
who had appeared in motion pictures. My impression would have been
that all sorts, that any conceivable right of publicity related to that
picture would have been given to the studio under a standard contract,
thereby precluding under contract law any claim now. Is that correct?
ANDERSON: Well, by and large it is. My expectation would be that
that's what I would find. However, the contracts vary substantially from
company to company in terms of the form that's used. Sometimes, it will
be a historical period where the draftsperson had not thought of
something that came along, and there will be a range of several years
where there will be a form that will have a gap in it in that particular
area. But you also have to be prepared that during the course of
negotiation, almost anything can happen to the form. In my experience
in the music industry, there are basic forms which will take a certain
direction - you can pretty much expect that those rights are given, but
in a particular instance almost anything can happen.
QUESTIONER: So in a dispute today, you have to try to find the
contracts that were signed?
ANDERSON: That's just the first thing to do.
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QUESTIONER: And what if you can't? Is there a presumption, an
industry presumption, a professional presumption?
ANDERSON: If you can't, the presumption is the errors and
omissions insurance company being very concerned of your going and
doing whatever you want without checking your rights, and that tends
to be a general commercial practice. Also, if you're going to exploit any
product, the last thing you really want with the, depending on, if you're
looking for controversy, you're looking for controversy, certain motion
pictures or certain recording artists may be, that's exactly what they're
looking for. But in many instances, you don't want to release a recording,
and at the same time, face a lawsuit by someone claiming that the
recording is a piece of garbage that tramples on the image of the artist.
It's really not a positive way to start things off, so you'll look to avoid it.
REICHMAN: My understanding is that in a lot of the old movie
contracts, the actors did convey all rights to the studio. I think even
under those old contracts there was a caveat for endorsing products, that
the actor's image won't be used to endorse products ....
QUESTIONER: Question for the panel. If we assume, as I think is
probably correct, that the United States is a net exporter of celebrity
talent, how ought the United States, what sorts of rights should we
extend to foreign celebrities in the United States and what sorts of rights
should we expect American celebrities to enjoy overseas?
ANDERSON: I think that moral rights are certainly more prevalent
overseas than they are here although there is some, those are the rights
not to have your work mutilated in some way that doesn't accurately
portray the authorship. That's a right that I think, because of the
expansion of Section 43(a) here, is although everyone says there are no
moral rights in the United States law, I think it's becoming part of the
law. I think we've seen under copyright law an effort to join the rest of
the world community and to try to have a more uniform copyright law.
There is still a considerable way to go, and hopefully as we look to
reap the benefits from exploitation in other territories, we'll bring more
of a uniform protection that's available in some other countries,
particularly performance rights in sound recordings in the United States.
We'll see it in a few years. We've never had that here. The record gets
played on the radio or on television. There's no right, no remuneration
at all to the record company or the performing artist, only to the
publisher of the song. Throughout the rest of the world that's not the
case. And as we see interactive technology become the primary source of
listening to music, where you just go in and push a button and pick
whatever you want instantaneously from any record ever recorded -
pull it up on your computer and there it is - there's going to have to be
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a change in the law to get some protection, otherwise no one will want
to be a recording artist if no one will pay for it.1
2
KURNIT: I would hope that we would continue to lead the world in
putting a premium value on the free exchange of information and ideas,
and I would ask what is so deficient in the copyright law and in the
Lanham Act concept that we already have precluding false implication
of endorsement, authorization, or association. Do we really want to add
an additional burden that anytime you want to use something, you have
to go find the heirs of the actor, and in addition to licensing the
copyright from the copyright owner, license the sort of parallel rights of
publicity? I suggest that we would all be better off if these artists have
the economic power that they share in the copyright. If they have the
ability, go off and form "Dreamworks," and own the copyright, be my
guest, rather than setting up an ill-defined parallel set of rights, which
will have to be cleared every time you want to use a photograph or a
piece of footage or otherwise exploit existing material in new media.
Right now in California, there is a case in which the two actors who
had subsidiary roles in the T.V. show Cheers are claiming that they have
publicity rights which must be licensed in licensing Cheers from the
owner of the copyright to set up venues in bars in airports because they
have two characters who are not look-alikes of the actors, although one
is rather chubby as I understand it, and one is a mailman as I under-
stand it. 3 The two actors who played those roles are asserting that
under the "Vanna White Principle," people walking into a bar named
"Cheers" and seeing two guys at the end of the bar in addition to
thinking of the characters, will also think of the actors who played those
characters. So now I have to go out and license again, this additional
right. You are putting up roadblocks on the information highway if you
follow down the road of expanding a parallel set of publicity rights on top
of copyright, trademark, and Lanham Act. I suggest the United States
should keep publicity rights as small as possible based on the balancing
of First Amendment interests to these very narrow property rights and
personal rights that I have advocated earlier.
ANDERSON: I advocate the First Amendment, but I'd rather see one
uniform set of these rules than fifty.
52.* After the symposium, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right In Sound
Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995), amending 17 U.S.C. §§
106, 114 (1994), granting a limited right of performance in sound recordings.
53.* See Wendt v. Host International, 50 F.3d 18 (9th Cir. 1995) (unpublished
disposition) (reversing District Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants).
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JONES: On that note, I would like to thank the panel very much and
thank the audience.
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